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THE HIGH COURT’S LOST CHANCE IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE: TABET
v GETT (2010) 240 CLR 537
In 2010 the High Court of Australia in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537
determined an appeal in a medical negligence case concerning a six-year-old
girl who had presented to a major paediatric hospital with symptoms over
several weeks of headaches and vomiting after a recent history of chicken
pox. The differential diagnosis was varicella, meningitis or encephalitis and
two days later, after she deteriorated neurologically, she received a lumbar
puncture. Three days later she suffered a seizure and irreversible brain
damage. A CT scan performed at that point showed a brain tumour. As
Australia does not have a no-fault system providing compensation to cover
the long-term care required for such a condition, the girl (through her parents
and lawyers) sued her treating physician. She alleged that, because a
cerebral CT scan was not performed when clinically indicated after the
diagnosis of meningitis or encephalitis and before the lumbar puncture, she
had “lost the chance” to have her brain tumour treated before she sustained
permanent brain damage. She succeeded at first instance, but lost on
appeal. The High Court also rejected her claim, holding unanimously that
there were no policy reasons to allow recovery of damages based on
possible (less than 50%) “loss of a chance” of a better medical outcome. The
court held that the law of torts in Australia required “all or nothing” proof that
physical injury was caused or contributed to by a negligent party. The High
Court, however, did not exclude loss of chance as forming the substance of a
probable (greater than 50%) claim in medical negligence in some future case.
In the meantime, patients injured in Australia as a result of possible medical
negligence (particularly in the intractable difficult instances of late diagnosis)
must face the injustice of the significant day-to-day care needs of victims
being carried by family members and the taxpayer-funded public hospital
system. The High Court in Tabet v Gett again provides evidence that, as
currently constituted, it remains deaf to the injustice caused by State
legislation excessively restricting the access to reasonable compensation by
victims of medical negligence.
INTRODUCTION
As the law of negligence has evolved in Australia, “loss of chance” has taken on a particular character
in medical negligence cases. In addition to its place in the quantification of damages, the concept has
been relied upon either as a cause of action, or as a specific type of harm. In “loss of a chance” cases,
the plaintiff “in effect redefines his or her physical loss (as a matter of pleading) as the chance of
avoiding a physical loss or the chance of obtaining a better physical outcome”.1 As a result of State
legislation severely constricting the capacity of injured patients to receive reasonable compensation
through tortious litigation, the concept was also a means of bringing greater equity into a
fundamentally unjust system.
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According to Gummow ACJ in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 (at [24]), this expansion has
been driven largely by “a tendency to run together questions of attribution of liability and the measure
of damages recoverable”. The result has been confusion regarding the state of the Australian common
law as regards the loss of chance doctrine. The reality, however, may be that such technical legal
claims are being forced upon plaintiffs in medical negligence cases in Australia because of
comparatively recent tort law statutory changes making successful claims extremely difficult and the
absence of a no-fault compensation scheme for medically-related injuries.
Over the past decade, Australian medical negligence law has undergone substantial legislative
change which has been criticised as unjust in previous editions of this column. In this revised
framework, the definition of harm does not include “loss of chance” or risk of injury in the definition
of “harm”.2 It was to this challenge, this chance of righting a profound wrong, that the High Court
turned its attention in Tabet v Gett.
EVENTS LEADING TO THE LITIGATION
The appellant, Reema Tabet, was six years of age when she presented to the Royal Alexandra Hospital
for Children in Sydney on 11 January 1991. Her parents gave her recent history of chickenpox as well
as headaches and vomiting for several weeks before as well as after that illness. The respondent,
Dr Maurice Gett, a paediatrician at the hospital, made a provisional diagnosis of chickenpox,
meningitis or encephalitis and Reema was admitted under his care as a public patient (at [4]). On
13 January at 11 am, nursing staff noticed that her pupils were unequal and that the right pupil was
fixed and dilated. Clinically, this is usually taken as a critical clinical sign that raised intracranial
pressure is compressing the optic nerve and that if that pressure is not relieved the patient’s brain stem
may herniate into the spinal column, causing death. In such a situation, a lumbar puncture may allow
microscopy, culture and antimicrobial sensitivities, but with the immediate attendant risk of herniation
of the brain stem into the spinal cord. For this reason, it is the clinical standard of care for a cerebral
CT scan to be performed before such a lumbar puncture to determine the degree of cerebal swelling
and – by extrapolation – cerebral pressure elevation.
The following day Reema suffered a seizure. At that point a cerebral CT scan and
electroencephalography (EEG) were ordered. She was diagnosed to be suffering from a brain tumour.
She received treatment, including an operation to remove the tumour. She suffered irreversible brain
damage, partly as a result of the events on 14 January 1991, partly from the tumour (which had been
growing for over two years), and partly from the operative procedure and other treatment (not said to
be in any way negligently performed). The central allegation was that the cerebral CT scan that was
undertaken on 14 January should have been performed earlier, either on 11 or 13 January, and that if
it had, treatments would have been available (intravenous corticosteroids and/or the insertion of a
drain into a cerebral ventricle) to reduce the intracranial pressure and so limit the risk of brain damage
before the tumour was surgically removed.3
HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In her action against Dr Gett, the appellant (through her tutor and uncle Ghassan Sheiban) alleged two
causes of action:
1. the respondent breached his duty to manage her with due care and skill and this caused or
contributed to cause her injury, loss and damage, or,
2. the respondent’s breach of duty led to “the loss of an opportunity to avoid injury, loss and
damage”.
2 For example, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5; and Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).
3 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 (at [5]), Gummow ACJ quoting Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 506-507 (Allsop P,
Beazley and Basten JJA).
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The case failed at first instance on the first ground.4 Studdert J held the respondent had breached
his duty of care by not ordering a CT scan on 13 January 1991.5 Studdert J, however, was
not persuaded, on the balance of probabilities, that if the respondent had ordered a CT scan on
13 January and the appellant was treated upon the discovery of the tumour, such brain damage as
occurred on 14 January would have been avoided. [The appellant’s] claim that such damage was caused
by the respondent therefore failed.6
The appellant’s case on the second cause of action was that the respondent’s negligence deprived
her of a chance, prospect or opportunity that had remained open only for a short period between her
hospital admission or the manifestation of the clinical sign of raised intracranial pressure at 11 am on
13 January and her seizure and deterioration on 14 January. The chance she claimed was that of
avoiding 25% of the eventual outcome.7 This claim was successful at first instance.
Studdert J found that, with a provisional diagnosis of meningitis or encephalitis (where the risk of
raised intracranial pressure is high), once clinical signs of its existence became manifest, a cerebral CT
scan should have been performed and the intracranial pressure on the brain should have been relieved
as soon as possible. Based on the evidence presented, two possible treatments were available: the
administration of corticosteroids or the insertion of an intraventricular drain.8 Studdert J found that it
was “more likely that steroids would have been prescribed rather than the placement of a drain” and
considered that corticosteroids would have had “some beneficial effect”.9 His Honour found that the
appellant “lost a chance of a better medical outcome had the brain tumour been detected on
13 January 1991, as it would have been if the CT scan had been performed that day”.10
In coming to this conclusion, the trial judge was faced with the question as to whether the
common law of negligence in Australia recognised
a less than even chance of avoiding an adverse health outcome as an interest of value to a patient, the
loss of which by reason of a doctor’s negligence, can be compensated as damage suffered by that
patient?11
His Honour was required to consider this question in the light of Australian common law as rhe
material events had occurred before the enactment of the controversial Civil Liability Act 2002
(NSW).12 In supporting a claim for damages for loss of a chance, Studdert J relied on the decisions of
the Victorian Court of Appeal in Gavalas v Singh (2001) 3 VR 404 and the New South Wales Court of
Appeal in Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678.
Having made this finding, Studdert J assessed the damage referable to the deterioration on
14 January as 25% of her ultimate disabilities and that the loss of chance of a better outcome was 40%
of this 25%. Based on these percentages, the appellant was awarded A$610,000 in damages.13
The Court of Appeal allowed Dr Gett’s appeal.14 It found that the appellant failed to demonstrate
that she had suffered more than the loss of the opportunity of a better outcome. She had also failed to
4 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [2] (Gummow ACJ).
5 Tabet v Mansour [2007] NSWSC 36.
6 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [106] (Keifel J).
7 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [29] (Gummow ACJ).
8 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [115] (Keifel J).
9 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [115], Keifel J quoting Tabet v Mansour [2007] NSWSC 36 at [378] (Studdert J).
10 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [7], Gummow ACJ quoting Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 507.
11 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [71], Heydon J citing Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 507.
12 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [2] (Gummow ACJ).
13 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [9], Gummow ACJ referring to Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 507.
14 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [107] (Kiefel J).
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show that the trial judge should have found, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent’s
negligence caused 25% of her overall disability after the operation.15
In the Court of Appeal’s view, to permit recovery for the claim for the loss of the chance would
revolutionise proof of causation of injury in medical negligence.16 In coming to this conclusion, the
Court of Appeal held that the loss of chance analysis adopted in Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR
678 (and Gavalas v Singh (2001) 3 VR 404) (supporting recovery where less that an even chance of
avoiding the adverse outcome was involved) “departed from conventional principles” and was
“plainly wrong”.17
THE HIGH COURT APPEAL
On appeal to the High Court in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, the appellant submitted that the
Court of Appeal erred in holding that the causal effects of the respondent’s negligence should be
assessed on the balance of probabilities and that the approach taken by the trial judge “on the basis of
loss of a chance of a better outcome” was correct (at [11], Gummow ACJ).
The appellant alleged there were two central issues of law:
• whether in a claim arising from personal injury the law of negligence permits the bifurcation of
the nature of the actionable damage attributable to the same breach of duty, so that failure of the
case on the first branch may be overcome by success on the second; and
• whether the evidence sufficiently supported the favourable finding at trial on the claim for loss of
opportunity (at [3], Gummow ACJ).
The respondent doctor’s case was that the evidence provided an insufficient basis for a favourable
outcome based on anything more than speculation. The respondent also submitted that the “chance”
found was inevitably indeterminate: “that steroids if administered, or an intraventricular drain if
inserted earlier, would have worked to lessen or prevent brain damage”. Counsel for the respondent
also submitted that there was no expert evidence as to the value of the lost chance or sufficiently
identifying the actual harm suffered on 14 January 1991 (at [32], Gummow ACJ).
The High Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal and unanimously dismissed the
appellant’s claim.
Gummow ACJ: Differences between recovery in contract and tort
Gummow ACJ held that the appellant’s case failed on two grounds. The first was the rejection of the
proposition that in personal injury cases the common law of Australia entertains action for recovery
when the damage is characterised as the loss of a chance of a better outcome of the character found by
the trial judge in this case (at [46]). The second reason was that the evidence presented at trial
provided a basis for no more than speculation as to the loss of a chance of a better outcome whether
assessed at 40% or (as the Court of Appeal had assessed) 15% (at [45], Gummow ACJ).
Gummow ACJ held that the law of torts should not be reformulated to “permit recovery for
physical injury not shown to be caused or contributed to by a negligent party, but which negligence
has deprived the victim of the possibility (but not the probability) of a better outcome” (at [25]).18 He
qualified this by noting (at [27]):
[T]his outcome will not require acceptance in absolute terms of a general proposition that destruction of
the chance of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a harm can never be regarded as supplying that damage
which is the gist of an action in negligence.
Further, if the likelihood of a better outcome had been found to be greater than 50%, then on the
balance of probabilities the appellant would have succeeded on the main branch of her case in
negligence (at [31]).
15 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [12] (Gummow ACJ).
16 Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 586.
17 Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 587.
18 Gummow ACJ, referring to Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 586.
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In this respect, Gummow ACJ discussed fundamental differences between the law of contract and
of torts. In contract law, action for breach of contract lies upon the occurrence of breach. In
negligence, an action lies only if and when damage can be proven to have been sustained. The relevant
importance of this difference for negligence cases was identified by Brennan J in Sellars v Adelaide
Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 at 359. Unlike an action in contract, “the existence and causation
of compensable loss in negligence cannot be established by reference to breach of an antecedent
promise to afford an opportunity” (at [47]). Gummow ACJ explained (at [50]):
[I]n an action in tort, where damage is the gist of the action, the issue which precedes any assessment of
damages recoverable is whether a lost opportunity, as a matter of law, answers the description of “loss
or damage” which is then compensable.19
A point of potential confusion arises from the fact that, in the tort of negligence, harm to the
interests of the plaintiff which is not sustained by injury to person or property, in the ordinary sense of
those terms, may qualify in at least some cases as the compensable damage consequent upon a breach
of a duty of care. In some negligence cases, recovery for “economic loss” has been permitted on this
basis.20 However, his Honour noted (at [46]) that this avenue of recovery does not indicate that the
principles of law applied in recovery of damages for breach of contract offer an appropriate analogy to
those in personal injury cases. As the Court of Appeal outlined, to reformulate the law of torts in this
way would involve
reference to an assessment of increased risk of harm, verbally reformulated into loss of a chance or
opportunity in order to equate it with the recognition in Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL and like cases
of the existence in commerce of a coherent notion of loss of a right or chance of financial benefit … In
our view, its limits (unless expanded by the High Court) must fall short of a proposition which
revolutionises the proof of causation of injury or [which redefines what is “harm”] in personal injury
cases.21
Having made the distinction between the principles applying in contract as opposed to torts law,
Gummow ACJ noted (at [21]) that if recovery were to be sought or permitted for a decrease in a
patient’s prospects of recovery, rather than the outcome, the diminished prospect has to be identified
and valued. This does not mean that, once an interest of value is identified, issues of causation do not
arise. His Honour added (at [29]):
[T]here may be the view that substituting loss of chance as an actionable damage assists the
maintenance of health care practice standards where there is a less than even chance of cure … but this
has to be weighed against, for example, the prospect of defensive medicine.
Heydon J: Discovery of fixed, dilated pupil not critical
Heydon J reviewed the two clinical management scenarios considered by Studdert J as providing the
potential to lessen the adverse outcome. His Honour identified the crucial question as whether the
chance of an occurrence of brain damage at 11.45 am on 14 January could have been reduced if the
defendant had arranged for a CT scan after the discovery of the fixed, dilated pupil at 11 am on
13 January (at [75]).
In relation to the insertion of a drain, Heydon J identified two alternative factual bases for loss of
chance (at [84]). First, there was the possibility that the damage took place in a relatively short period
of time at around 11.45 am on 14 January. The alternative was that the damage had taken place over
a continuous period. The trial judge had fixed a time when the damage started though did not choose
between two possibilities as to when it ended (at [84]).
The trial judge accepted general medical evidence that the longer the delay between deterioration
and intervention by the neurosurgeon, the greater the likely damage. However, according to Heydon J,
this did not overcome two problems:
• it was not until the time at which the damage started, that is, at about 11.45 am [on 14 January]
that there was any indication of the need to insert a drain; and
19 As Brennan J indicated in Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 at 359.
20 Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180.
21 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [26], Gummow ACJ quoting Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 586.
Medical law reporter
(2010) 18 JLM 275 279
• it had not been shown that, in the appellant’s circumstances, two hours would have made any
difference to the outcome.
With respect, the first finding does not give adequate significance to the discovery by the nursing
staff of a fixed dilated pupil one day earlier. This is usually taken as indicating the need for emergency
treatment to reduce raised intracranial pressure. This would especially be the case where the patient
already has a presumptive diagnosis of meningitis or encephalitis which carry a high risk of raised
intracranial pressure. In any event, Heydon J noted that one of the medical officers examined,
Mr Klug, gave evidence on the effects of steroids in a general sense. However, he did not give
evidence as to how these general conclusions applied to the circumstances of the appellant (at [93]).
All of the factors involved “supported the view that it was ‘very speculative’ as to whether steroid
treatment would have created chance of avoiding the incident on the 14 January 1991” (at [94]).
Heydon J concluded (at [97]-[98]) that, in light of the paucity of relevant evidence, the question as to
whether the appellant was deprived of a loss of chance of a better outcome had become purely
abstract, and one which he therefore was not called upon to decide in this case.
Keifel J, Hayne and Bell JJ and Crennan J: Difference between scientific and
legal causation
Keifel J focused on the distinction between the loss or damage necessary to found an action in
negligence, which is the injury itself and its foreseeable consequences, and damages, which are
awarded as compensation for each item or aspect of the injury (at [135]).22 Kiefel J held that mere
difficulty in estimating damages should not be permitted to render an award uncertain or impossible
(at [136]).23 Imprecision when assessing loss of chance is acceptable in the context of damages,
whether in contract or torts.24 Such imprecision, however, is not appropriate in proving loss of chance
when that loss is being considered as a type of harm or form of damage (at [39], Gummow ACJ).
On the issue of causation, Keifel J (at [113], with whom Hayne and Bell JJ in their joint judgment
and also Crennan J agreed) noted that, once causation is proved to the balance of probabilities, the
common law treats what is shown to have occurred as certain.25 Unlike proof in science or philosophy,
the purpose of proof at law is to apportion legal responsibility (at [113]).26 When loss or damage, eg,
is proved to have been caused by a defendant’s act or omission, a plaintiff recovers the entire loss (the
“all or nothing” rule). Keifel J noted (at [136]) that, with respect to causation, the general standard of
proof (the balance of probabilities) is to be maintained.27 The onus to prove that the defendant caused
the plaintiff’s loss of chance remains with the plaintiff. To permit recovery for the deprivation of the
possibility, but not the probability, of a better outcome would be to significantly alter the existing law
as to proof of causation of injury, in particular by redefining the concept of “harm”.28
Keifel J concluded (at [151]) that “the argument that there should be compensation where breach
of duty is proved simply denies proof of damage as necessary to an action in negligence”. To do so
would “divert attention from the proper connection between fault and damage. It is artificial and
breaks the causal link” (at [142]).29 Her Honour was not persuaded that “denial of recovery in cases of
this kind would fail to deter medical negligence or ensure that patients receive an appropriate standard
of care” (at [151]).
22 Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522 at 527.
23 Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 83, Mason CJ and Dawson J citing Fink v Fink (1946) 74
CLR 127 at 143.
24 Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638, Gummow ACJ quoting this case at [39].
25 Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166 at 176 (Lord Diplock); Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 642-643
(Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
26 Citing March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 at 509 (Mason CJ).
27 Citing Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 at 355 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), at 367
(Brennan J).
28 Citing Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 586.
29 Quoting Gonthier J in Laferrière v Lawson [1991] 1 SCR 541 at 591.
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FUTURE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CHANCE
Although the High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal, it did not exclude loss of chance as forming
the substance of a claim in medical negligence in the future.30 There may, it held, be “other cases in
which it might be said that, as a result of medical negligence, a patient has lost ‘the chance of a better
medical outcome’ [which] differ from the present case in significant respects”.31 As an example of
such a case, their Honours referred to reductions in life expectancy and to decisions in other
jurisdictions.
In Matsuyama v Brinbaum 890 NE (2d) 819 (2008), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, on the motion of the patient’s widow, awarded proportional damages against an
oncologist for failure to promptly diagnose gastric cancer by biopsy where the patient’s chance of
10 year survival was 37.5% before the negligence occurred. The cancer metastasised into an
inoperable phase, resulting in his premature death. Marshal CJ reasoned that to apply the “all or
nothing” rule (ie the “but for” test) in these circumstances would be unfair or would disadvantage the
plaintiff because
if a plaintiff has 51% chance of survival, and the negligent misdiagnosis or treatment caused that chance
to drop to zero, the estate is awarded full wrongful death damages. On the other hand, if a patient had
a 49% chance of survival, and the negligent misdiagnosis or treatment caused that chance to drop to
zero, the plaintiff receives nothing. So long as the patient’s chance of survival before the physician’s
negligence was less than even, it is logically impossible for her to show that the physician’s negligence
was the but-for cause of her death, so she can recover nothing … the all or nothing rule provides a
“blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent
chance of survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence”.32
Keifel J explained that the “proportional damages” awarded in Matsuyama referred to the
damages, expressed as a proportion of the total damages, which might have been awarded for
Mr Matsuyama’s wrongful death, but for which the defendant could not be held liable (at [138]). The
plaintiff was not required to prove the defendant’s omissions caused any harm in order that these
damages be awarded. The jury, in other words, did not identify the loss of chance as damage in the
sense of a specific harm (at [139]).
Gummow ACJ and Keifel J held that in Matsuyama v Birnbaum the court discussed the scientific
evidence available in medical malpractice suits, saying that this evidentiary reliability was “key” to its
recognition of loss of a chance and that successful loss of a chance claims required such evidence.
Marshal CJ reasoned (at 833):
A statistical survival rate cannot conclusively determine whether a particular patient will survive a
medical condition. But survival rates are not random guesses. They are estimates based on data obtained
and analyzed scientifically and accepted by the relevant medical community as part of the repertoire of
diagnosis and treatment, as applied to the specific facts of the plaintiff’s case.
Significantly, the court stated:
Where credible evidence establishes that the plaintiff’s or decedent’s probability of survival is 49%, that
conclusion is no more speculative than a conclusion, based on similarly credible evidence, that the
probability of survival is 51%.
In Matsuyama, the court found it appropriate to recognise loss of chance on the basis that medical
science had developed to a point that, “at least for some conditions, expert evidence could replace
speculation” (at 834).
As Spigelman CJ noted in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [60]:
Epidemiologists do make judgments about whether a statistical association represents a cause-effect
relationship. However, those judgments focus on what is sometimes called in the epidemiological
30 See Walsh G and Walsh A, “Tabet v Gett: The End of Loss of Chance Actions in Australia?” (2010) 18 JLM 50.
31 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [27] (Gummow ACJ), at [69] (Hayne and Bell JJ), at [129] (Kiefel J).
32 Citing Herskovits v Group Health Coop of Puget Sound 99 Wash 2d 609 at 614; 664 P 2d 474 (1983).
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literature “general causation”: Whether or not the particular factor is capable of causing the disease.
Epidemiologists are not concerned with “specific causation”: Did the particular factor cause the disease
in the individual case?
And at [79]:
[E]vidence of possibility expressed in opinion form and evidence of possibility from epidemiological
research or other statistical indicators, is admissible and must be weighed in the balance with other
factors, when determining whether or not, on the balance of probabilities, an inference of causation in a
specific case could or should be drawn.
The High Court cited cases based on life expectancy as an area in which loss of chance might
develop in the future. One reason for this may be that in such cases causation is shown on the basis of
hard rather than speculative data.
The House of Lords decision in Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 was also relevant. Mr Gregg
presented to his doctor with symptoms and clinical signs suggestive of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
However, his doctor failed to send him for a biopsy, so the diagnosis of cancer and initiation of
appropriate treatment was delayed for 12 months by which time the cancer had spread. Expert
evidence considered disease-free survival for 10 years as a “cure” for this form of cancer. This meant
that, from the point of diagnosis, Mr Gregg would need to remain disease free until at least 2008.
There was agreement that had Mr Gregg been promptly diagnosed and treated, his chance of “cure”
would have been 42%. Due to the later diagnosis, this chance was reduced to 25%.
Despite these predictions, the reality was that, against the odds, Mr Gregg had been in remission
since 1998 and there was no sign of recurrence of the disease in 2001, nor as the case proceeded to the
House of Lords. His sole complaint, therefore, was that his prospect of cure was reduced.
Complicating the issue was the fact that the chance had yet to run its course. The obvious question
arising was whether the damage, as a loss of chance, had actually been sustained.33 Lord Phillips, one
of the majority, said that it would be unsatisfactory to award damages for the reduction in the chance
of a cure when the long-term result of the treatment remained uncertain. In fact, to do so would
threaten the coherence of the common law.34
CONCLUSION
The orthodox view among academic commentators has been that until injury or economic loss is
proven to have occurred, no tort is committed and no damages are payable.35 This creates conceptual
difficulties when thinking through how “loss of chance” (particularly when the probability is less than
50%) could constitute a type of harm in the tortious arena. Loss of chance has been accepted as
founding recovery on the basis of economic loss in contract and in some cases in negligence.36
In Tabet v Gett the High Court affirmed the view that loss of a chance had a restricted place in the
law of negligence in Australia. The High Court refrained from reformulating the law of torts to
“permit recovery for physical injury not shown to be caused or contributed to by a negligent party, but
which negligence has deprived the victim of the possibility (but not the probability) of a better
outcome”.37 Significantly, the court did not exclude loss of chance forming the substance of a claim in
the future.38
So what are the areas where “loss of a chance” may result in successful claims in medical
negligence? First, these would be situations where good statistical evidence is available that treatments
33 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [16] (Gummow ACJ).
34 Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 at 221, cited in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [18] (Gummow ACJ).
35 Luntz H and Hambly D (eds), Torts: Cases and Commentary (5th ed, Butterworths, 2002) p 335.
36 Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180.
37 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [25], Gummow ACJ quoting Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at 586.
38 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [27] (Gummow ACJ), at [69] (Hayne and Bell JJ), at [129] (Kiefel J).
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forgone would have made a difference (that is, probability over 50%).39 Secondly, tortious “loss of a
chance” claims should play an important role in regulating situations where patients have been denied
prompt information about a diagnosis, or treatment options, or adverse events they have suffered, even
where the evidence of the difference that would have made is difficult to calculate. Loss of a chance
claims, however, should not be allowed to distort informed consent actions by establishing
professional practice standards requiring best possible rather than reasonably appropriate care.
On balance, it appears any further development of loss of chance as a gist of medical negligence
in Australia will be confined to cases in which a plaintiff’s life expectancy has been significantly
reduced and where the chance of survival if the alternative treatment had been made available can be
established as over 50%. In the meantime, because of the absence of a no-fault system of
compensation for such injuries, Australia’s legal system must face the injustice of the significant
day-to-day care needs of patients being borne by their relatives and the taxpayer-funded public
hospital system. Until such a no-fault compensation system is introduced, courts should be responsive
to the injustice implicit in the artificialities forced on plaintiffs by the current restrictive medical
negligence system. It is not fair that medical indemnity insurers being paid large amounts by both
practitioners and governments and being protected for claims by that system should be insulated both
by State legislation and the High Court from making a reasonable contribution to the considerable
needs of patients such as the appellant in this marginally defensible case.
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